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Introduction 
This chapter analyzes the trading practices and trends for the new, weak republic, the 
United States, from the beginning of its de fact independence in 1783 through the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars all the way to the period of peace in 1830. It taps 
into an important field of analysis, namely the discussion of the economic impacts of 
war on trade as well as the role of neutral and/or weaker states in wartime situations. 
Many scholars have recently investigated the disruptions caused by major conflicts 
like the world wars, and recent scholarship certainly places the revolutionary wars and 
the contingent Napoleonic conflicts into the same category. However, these scholars 
have paid relatively little attention to smaller (often neutral) players, like the Nordic 
countries, in these wars, assuming that they occupied an insignificant role in the 
conflict. 
Moreover, states that have a large geographic size, but lack political and military 
power, are either treated the same as great powers or ignored until they gain such 
status. We want to explore what kinds of changes, including structural, we see in the 
trade flows between the United States and both great powers and weaker states, 
especially whether the pressure of the war effort allowed more latitude for these states 
to explore their trade options. Furthermore, we investigate whether there are 
substantial changes, and what those changes would imply, in the types of goods 
exchanged over this complex period, hinting at the significance of this trade for both 
countries. Finally, we analyze whether economic and business concerns overrode 
political and diplomatic obstacles in these trade relations, thereby opening up 
opportunities for the smaller/weaker states. Our basic argument is that weak states 
were able to expand their trade and discover new markets during such large and 
protracted conflicts, although this was, as in the case of US–Portuguese trade in this 
period, typically a shorter-term phenomenon. Therefore, longitudinal analysis of US 
trade flows and behavior over the period of several conflicts will provide a fresh 
perspective on the role of this new, and oftentimes, weak state. 
Our key starting points are as follows: (1) small and medium-sized states have 
been a much more integral part of world trade than has previously been assumed, 
particularly during crisis periods; (2) crises tend to accentuate the importance of trade 
relationships between and with smaller nations, since many of them did not directly 
participate in the actual conflict, thus providing valuable raw materials and markets 
for the warring parties; (3) aggregate statistics are likely to understate this role, given 
that the focus in past scholarship has been mostly on trade between big players in the 
international system. Our findings support these hypotheses, by and large, even if 
solely looking at macro statistics. Smaller European states became much more 
important for US trade during the conflict period, albeit temporarily. We can also see 
that certain countries became particularly important, since they had the crucial raw 
materials needed during the age of global war. Moreover, the US also provided much-
needed materiél and food to smaller European nations such as Portugal. 
In the following chapter we first discuss why the study of smaller/weaker nations is 
important and review some of the existing scholarship of early American trade. Then 
we evaluate some broad trends in US trade and take a closer look at the role European 
nations other than Great Britain, France, and Germany played in this trade. Then we 
analyze the early 19th century and war years in the context of US trade and discuss 
US–Portuguese trade as a case in point, to be followed by some preliminary 
conclusions. 
Why study smaller (or weaker) states? 
The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars were truly total wars based on the methods 
chosen by the belligerents, which also affect countries outside the direct fighting. The 
effects of the war spilled over to influence the relations between neutrals as well. Due 
to the fact that these wars had an impact on the trade relations of all nations, many 
countries scrambled to find new outlets for exports and sources for imports. 
Respectively, the United States was particularly hard hit by these wars, which forced 
it to seek alternative trading partners and networks. Therefore, in this situation the 
bargaining power of weak (like the United States) and/or smaller states (like Portugal 
which was both weak and small) increased, albeit temporarily. 
Scholars have paid too little attention to the smaller players in times of war, often 
assuming that they occupied an insignificant role in the conflict. “Small power” and 
“smaller state”, typically and erroneously, imply small geographic size. A more fitting 
definition can perhaps be found in the use of the term “weak state”. This concept also 
applies to countries of considerable area, which were nonetheless weak (political 
and/or economic) players in the international system.1 Here we would argue that most 
European smaller states, like Portugal and Sweden, despite being a war zone for some 
portions of this period, were indeed such states; a state that increased its international 
trade and bargaining power due to aforementioned external conditions. The United 
States was a weak state as well, and for the most part in this period neutral, given its 
short existence and limited military power. 
Neutral states, including the Nordic countries for most of the period (when they 
were not under occupation), served a vital function during a wartime trading system, 
when traditional trading networks were disrupted. As Leos Müller has shown, the 
concept of neutrality evolved in the 17th century, and neutral participation in trade 
reduced transaction costs among the belligerents, circumventing blockades and other 
trade restrictions. The ability to use neutral states as trading partners and carriers of 
goods prevented the wholesale collapse of Atlantic commerce during the era of the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic conflicts.2 Neutral states, often treated differently by 
the belligerents based on past history and alliances, functioned in a treacherous 
economic environment, despite their efforts to pressure the great powers to recognize 
and respect their neutrality status. Some nations formed loose alliances between 
neutrals. To make this trading environment even more difficult, the British and French 
effectively instituted blockades on each other after 1802, developing later into the 
infamous Continental System by Napoleon in 1806.3 Neutrals, like the United States 
and Nordic countries, tried to find their niches under these conditions and, while the 
risks were high, the payoffs too were high. Belligerent nations were desperate for 
goods and supplies. In fact, the Continental System increased trading opportunities for 
some nations, increasing the transit trade between neutrals.4 And, while there have 
been studies on the trade behavior of some neutral states, including the United States, 
the networks between the neutrals and great powers have not yet been studied 
adequately.5 
Ultimately, it is completely natural to focus most of the analysis on the great 
empires, like Great Britain and France. After all, it is quite staggering to conceptualize 
the evolution of an empire like Great Britain, from its humble beginnings in the 16th 
century, with the building of the navy and its first major victory against the Spanish 
Armada, to the multicultural, industrialized empire that ruled the world in the 19th 
century.6 Additionally, the desire to understand the desperate, global conflict for 
supremacy from the 1790s to 1815 and Britain’s role in this process is again quite 
understandable.7 Also, the focus on the naval battles and strategies of these wars, 
including the building and development of the great fleets, seems quite logical and 
worthy of intense scholarship.8 But maybe the intense nature of these rivalries and the 
total wars between the great powers in fact explains why they had to rely on alliances 
with lesser powers to complement their war efforts. Therefore, even a great power 
like Great Britain had to tolerate the activities of the neutral states, sometimes to the 
detriment of their own war efforts. 
Trade and the Early Republic in the historiography 
Generally, the majority of books and articles on the Early Republic period of the 
United States are focused on the political and social changes that appear to dominate 
the period. However, little is said, other than fleeting mentions, of the importance of 
European trade in the economic development of the newly formed nation. This is a 
rather puzzling omission, especially considering the wealth of material available for 
the study of such factors. Still, there are a few studies that attempt to explain how the 
early US managed to expand its fledgling economy. 
Gordon Wood, a prominent American historian, wrote in his massive study of the 
Early Republic that American trade with Europe and the rest of the world increased 
thanks to the wars between the old trading powers. Furthermore, in the 1790s France 
and Spain threw “open their hitherto closed ports in the Caribbean to American 
commerce”.9 Americans also profited from the re-export trade, using their neutral 
ships as the means to transport goods from Europe to other areas of the globe. In 
addition, Wood maintained that the War of 1812 began because of Britain’s refusal to 
view American ships as neutral, thus limiting American trade to Europe.10 
Others also have pointed out the connection between trade and the leadup to the 
War of 1812. Frank Updyke, in his study of diplomacy before, during, and after the 
war, explained that the ultimately unsuccessful efforts of American politicians and 
officials to establish neutral status recognition from Britain were a major cause of the 
war.11 Yet, Updyke did little more than describe the diplomatic wrangling over neutral 
trade and offered little detail on how much that trade expanded prior to the war. 
Alfred T. Mahan argued that the discussion over which ports and countries American 
ships could trade goods with resulted in many near conflicts prior to the war and, 
eventually, sparked the war.12 Still, little has been said of how much those conflicts 
affected American trade. 
Somewhat closer to the topic of this chapter, Joyce Appleby discussed the growth 
of agriculture during the Early Republic period. She explained that higher prices in 
the 1790s created demand for more American agricultural products thanks to a variety 
of issues, including the Napoleonic Wars. However, she argued that it was not the war 
that drove prices higher, but rather the declining ability of Europeans to produce 
enough food domestically for the growing populations. Still, she maintains that, by 
1820, prices had dropped back to the pre-1790 levels as Europe was finally able to 
produce enough food for its population, not the end of Napoleonic warfare.13 Though 
her argument makes sense on the surface, she does not seem to consider that warfare 
limits the abilities of nations to produce agricultural products for a variety of reasons, 
including a lack of manpower and the necessity of feeding large armies and navies. 
Several authors have written about the entire American economy and its growth (or 
decline) prior to 1840. George Taylor argued that the American economy experienced 
a depression due to the American Revolution and the immediate aftermath from 1775 
until 1790. But he also showed how the young economy experienced a surge of 
growth in the 1790s until 1807 as embargoes and war took a toll on that growth.14 
Though he dealt mostly with standard of living and not trade, his assertions appear to 
back our hypothesis that the United States experienced an increase in its trade with 
Europe. Much like Taylor, Diane Lindstrom approached the same topic but with 
newer evidence. She found, however, that the economy did experience impressive 
growth, but she contended that it was at a lower level than Taylor argued. Ultimately, 
Lindstrom succumbed to a common bias in the historiography in viewing the Early 
Republic period as a precursor to industrialization.15 
Perhaps the most pertinent study in the historiography, Douglass C. North’s The 
Economic Growth of the United States, 1790–1860, explained that foreign trade was 
key to the overall development of the American economy. Even he was surprised at 
what he found when he began his research. As he wrote:  
Originally the study was to cover the years 1815 to 1860, on the hypothesis that 
this had been the critical period in the economy’s development. As work 
progressed it became clear that the previous era of warfare (and particularly the 
years 1793 to 1808) had played an important role in the country’s 
development.16  
Though his book incorporated a larger period than this chapter, North argued that the 
United States benefited greatly from the expansion in trade, both from re-exports and 
normal exports, to all of Europe, not just the major powers. This was due to the nearly 
constant state of warfare between the major powers and American neutrality during 
the period.17 
Not surprisingly, North’s view of the importance of the period of 1790–1808 has 
drawn criticism. Donald Adams Jr maintained that North overestimated the 
importance of the exports, arguing that the entire economy’s growth did not deviate 
from the long-run and modest growth experienced prior to the Civil War. He argued 
that only the re-export trade experienced any growth and “domestic trade exhibited 
little deviation” from normal trends.18 Claudia Goldin and Frank Lewis attempted to 
bridge the gap between Adams and North, staking the middle ground between the two 
opposing views. They contended that there was evidence to support North’s assertion 
that exports led to the growth of the economy, but not enough to assign exports 
preeminence over other domestic factors. However, they focused, as did Adams, on 
income per-capita growth and ignored the population growth of the period.19 
Furthermore, they did not engage much in the export analysis other than allowing it a 
more important role than Adams claimed. Ultimately, none fully discussed the 
amount of trade and how warfare affected either the growth or decline. We intend to 
show how the period of nearly constant warfare in Europe allowed American 
merchants the opportunity to expand their trade with more than just the major powers. 
More recently, historians have begun to ascertain the tremendous importance of 
European wars on American trade and even state formation. James Fichter made the 
bold argument that American trade (both prior to and after independence) in the East 
Indies directly influenced the development of capitalism and states in both the UK 
and the United States. More importantly, however, Fichter contended that American 
growth and success in the Indian Ocean as primary carriers of trade was directly 
related to the wars between France and England during the period 1798–1830.20 
Not only are historians examining the influence of trade on the American economy 
and state, but some are examining how American trade forced other, larger nations to 
adjust their strategies to meet the growing competition that US traders represented. 
John Haddad argued that Americans held a comparative advantage in China and the 
Indian Ocean over European merchants, especially those from England. The United 
States was such a young nation that very few institutional restrictions forced 
American merchants into pre-established protocols that British merchants, for 
example, were forced to follow under the auspices of the East India Company. As a 
result, both Haddad and Fichter suggested that American success in the Indian Ocean 
caused the ultimate downfall of the British East India Company’s monopoly as British 
officials sought to compete effectively.21 
Aggregate trends in US trade, from the 18th century to 1860 
(and beyond) 
There are few historians who approach the subject of US trade prior to the Civil War 
and fewer still who are interested in our time period. Some have examined the period 
from 1770 to 1860 on an even larger scale than we do here, studying the overall 
American economy with less focus on the foreign trade.22 Some in the past were 
seriously interested in the economic trends of the 19th century; as multiple 
conferences were held in the 1950s and 1960s with this topic in mind. Yet, the authors 
and academics who are interested in these trends tended to view them via the lenses of 
the Civil War and industrialization. Most were concerned with finding some piece of 
key data or analysis that explains how ready, or not ready, the American economy 
was for industrialization or the horrors of war.23 
One exception to the others in the historiography was an upper-level textbook that 
discussed the long-run trends of the period in question. The authors, North among 
them, explained that the period of 1775–1840 was one of the highest rates of growth 
ever recorded.24 Still, there was little discussion of the importance of trade in the 
context of that expansion, and how European wars affected the American economy. 
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Table 2.1 
Exports to England from the colonies and imports from England to the colonies, 
1693–1790 
Year Exports to England Imports from 
England 
Net balance 
1693 113,600 169,381 –55,781 
1700 395,021 344,341 50,680 
1710 249,814 293,659 –43,845 
1720 468,188 319,702 148,486 
1730 572,585 536,860 35,725 
1740 718,416 813,382 –94,966 
1750 814,768 1,313,083 –498,315 
1760 761,099 2,611,764 –1,850,665 
1770 1,015,535 1,925,571 –910,036 
1780 18,560 825,431 –806,871 
1790 1,043,389 3,258,238 –2,214,849 
Source: Carter et al. (2006).  
Note 
Values in pounds sterling, in constant values.  
Unfortunately, we know much less about the aggregate trade before the 1770s, 
given the typical scholars’ preoccupation with the American Revolution. However, 
we have more information about trade at the state level. As seen in Table 2.1, trade 
between Massachusetts and England increased rapidly in the 18th century, prior to the 
Revolution when volatility became very high. In particular, Massachusetts 
experienced a turbulent period of volatility for its fishing industry in 1770–1810. The 
American Revolution virtually destroyed the state’s commercial fishing, but it 
experienced a revival very shortly after the end of the Revolution, recovering “more 
than 70 percent of their pre-Revolutionary levels” by 1790. The average annual 
amount of codfish exported to Europe in 1765–1775 was 178,800 (hundredweight), 
whereas it was lower in 1786–1790, at 108,600 (hundredweight). The number of 
vessels involved, as well as the tonnage, also declined.25 Once the wars between 
France and England began in the 1790s, price levels rose quite high. Thus, tonnage 
for the “state climbed from 19,185 in 1789, to 42,746 in 1798, to 69,306 in 1807.” 
More importantly, average exports of cod per annum expanded from 250,650 
(quintals) for the period 1786–1790 to 523,440 for 1803–1807.26 This is further 
evidence that the wars in Europe not only expanded American trade, but helped 
fisheries recover from a destructive war for independence and even exceed prewar 
levels. 
European and American trade, though largely maintained through the larger 
powers, became a nearly necessary means by which the young republic could solidify 
its fledgling economy. Nonetheless, some politicians and administrations felt that it 
could be used as a diplomatic tool. Jefferson’s Embargo Act of 1807 was just one 
example of American trade being used for political purposes. The intention was to 
pressure France and Britain, through economic hardship, into accepting American 
neutrality. Unfortunately, it also prohibited trade with nations not named France or 
Britain. Therefore, it caused widespread domestic hardship and smuggling, and did 
not affect its intended targets in any meaningful way.27 Essentially, the embargo 
ended one of the largest periods of growth in exports in American history as seen in 
Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1 
US exports and imports as a percentage of GDP, 1790–1950. 
Source: Carter et al. (2006). 
At the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th, American ships 
became almost exclusive carriers of commerce throughout the Atlantic thanks to 
major war between France and England. In his diplomatic exertions in 1808, James 
Monroe justified his attempts to re-establish neutral status for American merchants 
and ships explained that the “United States were in a prosperous and happy 
condition”, prior to 1808; “as a neutral power, they were almost the exclusive carriers 
of the commerce of the whole world”.28 
As seen in Figure 2.1, the relative economic weight of both exports and imports 
has declined over the 19th and 20th centuries. Furthermore, we can see that trade 
dependence was higher during the years of the Early Republic, and there was much 
more volatility too. A substantial drop in exports and imports seemed to occur during 
conflict periods, for example, the Napoleonic wars and the Civil War; however, 
during the world wars, for example, exports increased substantially. 
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Figure 2.2 
US Trade dependence and real GDP per capita, 1790–1950 
Source: Carter et al. (2006). 
 
As displayed in Figure 2.2, over time US trade dependence has declined 
noticeably, while economic development and standard of living have increased 
dramatically. This also represents the period during which US became an economic 
and political superpower, as seen in Figure 2.3. US gained power vis-à-vis the other 
players in the international system in the late 19th century and was finally regarded as 
a (minor) great power after the turn of the century, although US did not take on the 
role of a superpower until after World War II.29 The CINC-index climbs substantially 
after that point. We can see that energy consumption, perhaps a proxy for economic 
expansion, developed much more evenly and earlier than the political (or military) 
power. Typically, most of these types of indices consider US a great power only after 
1898, the Spanish-American War. Even then it would be a stretch to call the US a 
great power, though, given its military weakness. 
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Figure 2.3 
US great power status and energy consumption, 1816–1950. 
Sources:  Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey (1972), data from 
www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/Capabilities/nmc3-02.htm.  
Note 
Details on the calculation of the CINC score can be found here: 
www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/Capabilities/NMC_Documentation.pdf. Energy 
consumption expressed in thousands of coal-ton equivalents.  
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Figure 2.4 
Total US exports and imports, and the net balance, in millions of USD, 1790–1950. 
Source: Carter et al. (2006). 
As seen in Figure 2.4, exports and imports seem to have grown in tandem over the 
time period from 1790 to World War I, at least when analyzed in real values. 
Moreover, although exports expanded strongly during the world wars, the net balance 
was positive for most of this period. 
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Figure 2.5 
US exports to Europe and the UK, 1790–1950. 
Source: Carter et al. (2006). 
However, as we have already suggested, it would be misleading to analyze US 
trade simply from the perspective of aggregate trade figures; in particular, let us 
examine US trade with Europe in more detail, namely what the main trends were over 
time. First of all, European share of the US exports was over 50 percent for most of 
the period depicted in the Figure 2.5. The major dips in this share occurred during the 
war years, the importance of the European markets started to wane in the 20th 
century, but the aggregate share still remained over or around 50 percent at that point. 
This suggests that wars tended to involve both parties and induce dramatic volatility 
in their trade relationships. However, the aggregate trends may, again, be somewhat 
misleading, since they do not tell us much about the individual countries involved. In 
fact, did the wars have a similar impact on all European countries’ trade? 
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Figure 2.6 
US exports to nations other than UK, France, and Germany, 1790–1950. 
Source: Carter et al. (2006).  
 
When we expand our analysis to look at the breakdown between the biggest 
European nations and the “others”, a different picture emerges. It seems that the 
“others” did a lot of business with the United States especially in the beginning of the 
19th century and during the world wars. This is the pattern seen in Figure 2.6. This 
suggests that it would be equally misleading to focus on just the big European nations 
as America’s trading partners, in fact we would argue that that would leave out a big 
chunk of the trade, especially during crises. In real terms, as seen in Figure 2.7, the 
volume of imports from nations other than the “big three” increased greatly during the 
Napoleonic Wars, only to experience a rapid reduction afterwards, with a steady 
growth trend until 1860. While we do not have the aggregate import figures before 
1820, it is quite likely that the imports developed similar to exports during the war 
years, since they seemed to behave (somewhat) similarly afterwards. On the eve of 
the Civil War, exports peaked again, with imports showing much more volatility. 
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Figure 2.7 
US exports to and imports from nations other than UK, France, and Germany, in real USD 
(1830 = 100), 1790–1860. 
Source: Idem. 
We can get a bit more information about trade by looking at the actual tonnage 
employed in US trade during the Early Republic. As seen in Figure 2.8, foreign 
vessels were quite important when US entered into world markets as a sovereign 
nation in the 1780s. Then the share declined to a lower level until 1810, and then there 
was a sharp spike and a slightly higher level afterwards. Foreign vessels became 
crucial for the US during the key years of the Napoleonic Wars and, of course, the 
War of 1812. Therefore, it is important to take a closer look at the war years, and the 
1810s in particular. How did the war affect US trade relations, in particular with 
smaller (or neutral) nations? 
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Figure 2.8 
American and foreign tonnage employed in US foreign trade, 1789–1832. 
Source: Pitkin (1835). 
US trade in the period 1790 to 1830: the impact of the war 
years 
The Napoleonic Wars, and the War of 1812 in particular, strained former alliances 
and forced countries like the US to rely more heavily on trade with smaller/weaker 
nations. It is quite noteworthy that the US did a lot of business with Portugal during 
those years, even though Portugal was an ally of Britain. Necessities of war dictated 
that countries adopt more practical solutions to their supply problems, sometimes 
turning a blind eye to violations of sanctions or embargoes. 
As seen in Figure 2.9, the share of smaller nations of the total tonnage used in US 
foreign trade increased first in the 1790s, spiking dramatically during the 1810s. The 
tonnage of smaller nations proved to be crucial in supporting the US war effort, 
especially since the American Navy was still in its infancy. 
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Figure 2.9 
Foreign tonnage entering US ports, 1789–1833: percentage share of nations other than 
Great Britain, France, or Germany. 
Source: Pitkin (1835). 
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Figure 2.10 
Spanish, Portuguese, and Swedish tonnage entering US ports, 1789–1833. 
Source: Idem. 
Moreover, as seen in Figure 2.10, smaller nations were eager to do business with 
the US. Spain, which was under Napoleon’s rule and partially a war zone, did not 
have any compulsions about trading with the Americans. Portugal, which was on the 
other side of the Peninsular War, also increased its trade with the US, especially 
during 1810–1814. 
Even smaller nations like Sweden did the same, and in fact matched the Spanish 
volume of trade (as expressed through tonnage) during the 1810s. Figure 2.11 shows 
that US exports to European nations other than Britain, Germany, and France were 70 
percent of the total in 1810, and typically remained at least a quarter of the total trade 
in this period. As we have indicated, we have data on imports (at this point) only from 
1820 onwards, so it is more difficult to examine that dimension of trade. However, all 
signs, including tonnage figures, point to similar conclusions for the imports. 
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Figure 2.11 
US Exports to and imports from Europe, 1790–1830 
Source: Carter et al. (2006). 
If we look at Tables 2.2 and 2.3, we can discern the main US export and import 
products. Agricultural products were initially more important as export products, and 
by 1830 cotton had become the most important item by far, thereby feeding the 
British Industrial Revolution. However, during the Napoleonic Wars, it seems clear 
that the US became essential in supplying the foodstuffs that feed armies and civilians 
alike. In Table 2.4, we can see that, during periods of intense warfare between Britain 
and France, US wheat and flour exports were at much higher levels than both before 
and after the Napoleonic Wars, excepting years when the US was at war or attempting 
trade embargoes. We have more limited information about imports, but coffee, tea, 
and spices were important, along with some manufactured products. 
<<Table 2,2 HERE>> 
Table 2.2 
Main US export products, 1790–1830 
Year Total 
value 
Cotton, 
quantity 
Cotton, 
value 
Tobacco, 
quantity 
Tobacco, 
value 
Wheat, 
quantity 
Wheat, 
value 
1790 – – – 118 4 1 1 
1800 – 18 – 79 – – – 
1810 27 93 15 84 5 – – 
1820 39 128 22 84 8 – – 
1830 45 298 30 84 6 – – 
Source: Carter et al. (2006).  
Notes 
Values in millions of dollars.  
Quantities in millions of pounds, wheat expressed as million 60-pound bushels.  
The only other product listed in this source is “other wood manufactures”, which 
amounted to 4 million dollars in 1820 and 2 million in 1830. 
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Table 2.3 
Main US import products, values, 1790–1830 
Year Total 
value 
Coffe
e 
Te
a 
Suga
r 
Wool 
manufactures  
Cotton 
manufactures 
Iron and steel 
manufactures 
1790 – – – – – – – 
1800 – – – – – – – 
1810 – – – – – – – 
1820
* 
23 4 1 4 6 8 – 
1830 29 4 2 5 6 6 6 
Source: Carter et al. (2006).  
Notes 
All expressed as values, in millions of dollars.  
* = for coffee, tea, and sugar, we used 1821 values, since the previous year numbers 
were not available. Therefore, the total is also an approximation. 
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Table 2.4 
US wheat and flour exports, 1791–1816 
Year Wheat 
(bushels) 
Average 
price per 
bushel ($) 
Flour 
(barrels) 
Average 
price per 
barrel ($) 
Value of 
both ($) 
1791  1,018,339  –  619,681  – – 
1792  853,790  –  824,464  – – 
1793  1,450,575  –  1,074,639  – – 
1794  696,797  –  846,010  – – 
1795  141,273  –  687,369  – – 
1796  31,226  –  725,194  – – 
1797  15,655  –  515,633  – – 
1798  15,021  –  567,558  – – 
1799  10,056  –  519,265  – – 
1800  26,853  –  653,052  – – 
1801  239,929  –  1,102,444  – – 
1802  280,281  –  1,156,248  – – 
1803  686,415  –  1,311,853  –  9,310,000  
1804  127,024  –  810,008  –  7,100,000  
1805  18,041  –  777,513  –  8,325,000  
1806  86,784   1.33   782,724   8.00   6,867,000  
1807  766,814   1.25   1,249,819   7.00   10,753,000  
1808  87,330   1.25   263,813   6.50   1,936,000  
1809  393,889   1.25   846,247   6.00   5,944,000  
1810  325,924   1.50   798,431   7.50   6,846,000  
1811  216,833   1.75   1,445,012   9.50   14,662,000  
1812  53,832   1.94   1,443,492   10.00   13,687,000  
1813  288,535   1.75   1,260,943   11.00   13,591,000  
1814 – –  193,274   9.50   1,734,000  
1815  17,634   1.25   862,739   8.00   7,209,000  
Source: Pitkin (1835). 
US trade with Portugal during the war years: small nations 
mattered 
As a consequence of the close relations between the Portuguese and British empires, 
well established as an ancient alliance and strengthened during that critical period, in 
the early years of the 19th century England was both the main supplier and client of 
the Portuguese market. This became particularly apparent in 1808 to 1813, as several 
nations ceased to trade with Portugal, and the English, American, and Spanish traders 
picked up the slack. In particular, the American market became a pivotal target and 
source for Portuguese merchants, as other markets were difficult to reach.30 
<<Table 2,5 HERE>> 
Table 2.5 
Portuguese Trade with Sweden and Denmark, 1776–1831 (unit: contos de réis) 
Year Imports from 
Sweden 
Exports to 
Sweden 
Imports from 
Denmark 
Exports to 
Denmark 
1776 155 28 1 25 
1787 270 30 2 22 
1796 1,290 330 26 285 
1807 733 181 140 87 
1816 522 146 56 37 
1826 328 115 105 51 
1831 222 114 3 15 
Sources: “Portugal’s Balance of Trade with Foreign Nations and Portuguese 
Colonies”, Portugal’s Balance of Trade with the US. Arquivo Histórico do Rio de 
Janeiro, Balança Geral do Commercio do Reyno de Portugal com as Nações 
Estrangeiras em o anno de 1798 e 1808 (Portugal’s Balance of Trade with Foreign 
Nations in 1798 and 1808) Contadoria da Superintendência Geral dos Contrabandos e 
Descaminhos dos Reais Direitos. Instituto Nacional de Estatística, Balanças Gerais 
do Comércio do Reyno de Portugal com os seus Domínios Ultramarinos e Nações 
Estrangeiras de 1796–1797, 1799–1807, 1809–1831 (Portugal’s Balance of Trade 
with Foreign Nations and Portuguese Colonies 1796–1797, 1799–1807, 1809–1831), 
Contadoria da Superintendência Geral. 
As Leos Müller has shown already, American shipping increased dramatically 
during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic conflicts, with a 300 percent increase in 
capacity. American shipowners focused heavily on export trade, which meant that 
they had to find suitable return cargoes. Moreover, as the Napoleonic conquests 
continued, there were fewer places to do business with in Europe. Therefore, the 
Nordic markets – Sweden in particular, since it was not conquered – formed important 
destinations for the Americans.31 Similarly, Portuguese trade with the Nordic 
countries increased substantially during the war years (see Table 2.5), although there 
were some years during which trade was curtailed as well. Trade with the other 
neutrals helped circumvent wartime regulations and shifting alliances, as well as 
formed important niche markets for countries like Portugal and the United States. 
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Table 2.6 
Main US products imported by Portugal, 1796–1820 (percent) 
Year Percentage of total 
imports 
Flour Corn Wheat Rice 
1796 14.0 3.3 96.7 0.0 0.0 
1797 77.0 24.3 8.0 1.7 65.9 
1798 78.7 9.1 42.3 7.4 41.1 
1799 78.5 4.3 71.5 6.6 17.6 
1800 73.4 19.9 71.4 0.0 8.7 
1801 95.2 14,4 53.8 5.7 35.4 
1802 86.1 76.0 23.2 0.3 0.5 
1803 96.1 47.8 43.5 3.2 5.5 
1804 90.0 46.1 27.7 24.9 1.3 
1805 69.1 50.3 35.4 13.4 0.9 
1806 87.7 53.5 26.6 19.9 0.0 
1807 93.9 79.5 14.4 6.1 0.0 
1808 94.8 72.6 17.2 10.2 0.0 
1809 74.6 63.3 26.5 9.2 1.8 
1810 68.0 69.0 0.0 31.0 0.0 
1811 82.7 69.2 13.4 6.3 11.2 
1812 95.4 57.6 24.2 4.3 13.9 
1813 91.0 56.2 24.7 11.1 8,0 
1814 40.3 69.4 19.9 4.8 5.9 
1815 90.8 61.4 15.8 5.2 17.6 
1816 85.8 62.8 25.1 7.0 11.2 
1817 79.0 75.8 0,0 16.6 7.6 
1818 91.3 25.4 39,4 4.8 30.6 
1819 86.3 13.4 70.8 7.1 8.7 
1820 19.8 88.3 10,.4 1.4 0.0 
Sources: “Portugal’s Balance of Trade with Foreign Nations and Portuguese 
Colonies”, Portugal’s Balance of Trade with the US. 
Based on Maria Cristina Moreira´s research, Portuguese imports were dominated 
by the key players throughout this period, from 1796 to 1831, as they represented 
more than 89 percent of the total imports. Of the eight countries that dominated the 
import flows, the US occupied sixth position as a supplier from 1801 to 1807 (1,185 
contos,32 6.9 percent); seventh between 1814 and 1820 (711 contos, 3.9 percent), and 
fell below eighth position from 1796 to 1800 (411 contos, 0.1 percent). It is surprising 
that, from 1808 to 1813, the United States became the second most important 
importer and that Portuguese imports from the US peaked, representing around six 
times the value of the average for the period. In general, these years represented a 
great boon for the exports and imports to and from the US. Typically, dependence on 
the Portuguese side on American cereals was quite striking, and these imports kept 
Portuguese society and English troops alive during the most difficult period of the 
Peninsular War (see also Table 2.6).33 The Portuguese market was also important on 
the American side, often representing a top-three destination for the American 
exporters. 
Conclusions and further challenges 
Our key assumptions were that (1) small and medium-sized states have been a much 
more integral part of world trade than has previously been assumed, particularly 
during crisis periods; (2) crises tend to accentuate the importance of trade 
relationships between and with smaller nations, since many of them did not directly 
participate in the actual conflict, thus providing valuable raw materials and markets 
for the warring parties; (3) aggregate statistics are likely to understate this role, given 
that the focus in past scholarship has been mostly on trade between big players in the 
international system. Our findings support these hypotheses, by and large, although 
our data are somewhat limited (especially for imports). Smaller/weaker European 
states became much more important for US trade during the Napoleonic wars, though 
temporarily. We can also see that certain countries became particularly important, 
since they had the crucial raw materials needed during the age of global war. 
Moreover, the US also provided much-needed material and food to smaller European 
nations. 
In this chapter, we wanted to explore what kinds of changes, including structural, 
we can see in the trade flows between US and both great powers and weaker states, 
especially whether the pressure of the war effort allowed more latitude for these states 
to explore their trade options. The answer is affirmative – the demands of global war 
outweighed other (such as alliance) considerations. Economic and business concerns 
overrode political and diplomatic obstacles in these trade relations, thereby opening 
up opportunities for the smaller/weaker states. Our basic argument is that weak states 
were able to expand their trade and discover new markets during such large and 
protracted conflicts, although this was, as in the case of US–Portuguese trade in this 
period, typically a shorter-term phenomenon. The networks gained during such 
conflicts would not last during peacetime, when market conditions changed. 
Therefore, longitudinal analysis of US trade flows and behavior over the period of 
several conflicts will provide a fresh perspective on the role of this new, and often 
weak, state. 
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Notes 
                                                          
1 Handel (1981). See also Eloranta (2002). On the concept of small states in general, 
see Joenniemi (1998). 
2 Müller (2004, 2008) See also Davis and Engerman (2006). On definitions of 
neutrality as well as small state challenges, see Ackerman (1983); Karsh (1988). On 
the American interpretations of neutrality and its implications in this time period, see 
especially Bukovansky (2003). 
3 Davis and Engerman (2006), particularly chapter 2. For an innovative look at the 
Napoleonic power politics and alliances, see Rosecrance and Lo (1996). For a classic 
account on the Continental System, see Heckscher (1922). 
4 Müller (2004: chapter 7). 
5 See the studies listed in Müller (2004). On Denmark, see also Ruppenthal (1943). 
On American trade history and the impact of the blockades, see Hickey (1981); Keene 
(1978). 
6 The literature on the great empires is massive and cannot be adequately summarized 
here. Some of it is discussed in an interesting theoretical article about how and why 
such empires have come about, see Turchin (2009). 
7 See e.g. Bell (2007). On the debt burden incurred by Great Britain, reaching at its 
height over 300 per of GDP, see Ferguson (2001); Stasavage (2003). 
8 On the history of the British naval fleet, see especially Kennedy (1976). 
                                                                                                                                                                      
9 Wood (2009: 622623). 
10 Ibid.: 622–623, 658. 
11 Updyke (1915: 59–62). 
12 Mahan (1905: 98–100). 
13 Appleby (1982: 839–840). 
14 Taylor (1964). 
15 Lindstrom (1979: 290, 298–299). 
16 North (1961: vii). 
17 Ibid.: 36–37, 53. 
18 Adams Jr (1980: 713–714). 
19 Goldin and Lewis (1980). 
20 Fichter (2010: 1–4). On state formation, see e.g. Acemoglu, Garcia-Jimeno, and 
Robinson (2015); Acemoglu and Robinson (2013); Besley and Persson (2009, 2010); 
Dincecco (2015); Dincecco and Katz (2016). 
21 Haddad (2014: 2–4, 80); Fichter (2010: 28). 
22 Gallman and Wallis (2007). This collection of articles provides important 
background information for the entire American economy until the Civil War.  
23 Ruggles (1962). This is one example of those that view the Early Republic period 
as a precursor to American industrialization. 
24 Davis et al. (1971: 21–25). 
25 Carter et al. (2006: 701). 
26 Vickers (1994: 266–267). 
27 Watts (1989). 
28 As quoted in Mahan (1905: 99). 
29 Eloranta (2006). 
30 On the trade patterns before 1770, see Fisher (1963). 
31 Müller (2006, 2008, 2016). 
32 Moreira and Eloranta (2011). Contos here means contos de réis, where réis were a 
Portuguese monetary unit of the time: one conto corresponded to one million réis. 
33 Except for 1796 (staves comprising 66.0 per cent) and two other years, 1814 and 
1820, which include different products that represented less than 10 per cent of the 
total imports, with the exception of butter (14.5 per cent) in 1814 and fish oil (16.1 
per cent) in 1820.  
